Introduction: Humanitarian agencies in North Korea operate within a complex sociopolitical environment historically characterized by a baseline of mistrust. As a result of operating within such a heated environment, health sector collaborations between such agencies and the North Korean government have followed unpredictable courses. Problem: The factors that have contributed to successful programmatic collaborations, as perceived by United States non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and North Korean officials were investigated. Methods: A qualitative, multi-case, comparative, research design using semistructured interviews was used. Expert North Korean informants were interviewed to generate a list of factors contributing to programmatic success, defined as fulfilling mutually established objectives through collaboration. The North Korean informants were asked to identify US NGOs that fulfill these criteria ("mission-compatible NGOs"). Representatives from all of the missioncompatible NGOs were interviewed. All informants provided their perspectives on the factors that contributed to successful programmatic collaborations. The interviews were recorded, transcribed, and analyzed for thematic content. Results: North Korean informants identified six mission-compatible US NGOs. The North Korean and US NGO informants provided a number of factors that contributed to successful programs. These factors were grouped into the following themes: (1) responsiveness to North Korean requests; (2) resident status; (3) program monitoring; (4) sincerity (apolitical objectives); (5) information gathering; and (6) interagency collaboration. Conclusions: Some US NGOs have devised innovative measures to work within a unique set of parameters in North Korea. Both US NGOs and North Korean authorities have made significant concessions to maintain their programmatic partnerships. In this manner, seasoned collaborators have employed creative strategies and a form of health diplomacy to facilitate programmatic success in North Korea by building trust within a complex sociopolitical space. 
Maintaining Health Sector Collaborations
covered that the situation is nuanced. The North Korean official that he interviewed stated:
The rumor that these organizations had diff iculty obtaining access is simply not true. We gave them access. We did, however, have problems with international aid agencies that demanded access everywhere they wanted to go, yet provided only minimal amounts of medicine. 14, 15 This account suggests that perceptions around the causes of program failure vary, and that both sides may have justifiable reasons for discontent. The North Korean officials did tighten restrictions on access to particular groups that resulted in conditions that were unacceptable for some agencies. The North Koreans, however, cited that selected agencies were requesting an unwarranted degree of access considering the amount, type, and quality of aid provided. In contrast to these failed programs, other collaborations, such as those with Eugene Bell, have reached mutual objectives and have developed into longer-term programs. In order to better understand what factors have led to successful program implementation in North Korea, this study investigated the factors that contribute to programmatic success as well as factors that undermine success. For the purposes of this study, success was defined as the subjective perception of the ability to fulfill established programmatic objectives. Understanding the perspectives of both successful NGOs and North Korean officials was critical to addressing this topic systematically and equitably. This study focused on selected health sector collaborations between US NGOs and the North Korean Ministry of Health so as to inform future humanitarian operations by US-based NGOs. Considering the unprecedented sociopolitical strain that these collaborations have experienced, they will provide useful insights for collaborators facing similar challenges.
Methods

Overall Research Design
A qualitative, multi-case comparative research design was chosen for the study. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with key informants. The structured interviews were adapted from prior health sector investigations in Palestine and Tanzania. 16, 17 The study design was approved by the Institutional Review Board at Stanford University.
Participants, Interviews, and Data Collection
During the first phase of this investigation, three expert informants from the North Korean public health system were interviewed. These informants were selected by the Ministry of Health to represent perspectives at the government and hospital levels of its health sector. The informants also were chosen for their extensive experience working with US NGOs. This included the Deputy Director of Foreign Relations in the Ministry of Health, as well as two healthcare professionals working in hospitals that have interacted closely with US NGOs. The interviews began by ensuring agreement and standardization regarding the definition for programmatic success, defined by the investigators as fulfilling mutually established objectives through collaboration. The North Korean informants agreed to this highly developed: sanitation standards were paramount, technology was cutting-edge, access was universal, preventive care was emphasized, and healthcare services were free of charge. 3 However, the relative prosperity began to decline during the 1980s as North Korea reached the limits of its agricultural capacity. 4 Soon afterward, the Soviet bloc began to crumble, thus, eliminating crucial partners for subsidized energy and trade. 5 This set the stage for an agricultural crisis that followed the death of their revered leader of 40 years, Kim Il-Sung, and a series of disasters caused by natural hazards in the mid-1990s. Under such accumulated strain, the healthcare system buckled as the production of domestic pharmaceuticals shut down, hospital admissions increased, the burden of infectious disease escalated, and obstetric care declined.
In response to these escalating needs, the DPRK cautiously increased access to foreign humanitarian aid organizations. The United Nations Development Program opened an office in the DPRK in the 1980s. In the late 1990s, the World Health Organization (WHO) collaborated with the North Korean government to address a malaria epidemic. 7, 8 Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) from South Korea also supplied equipment, clinical techniques, and medications for an increasing burden of helminthic infections. 9 Soon thereafter, US NGOs joined the efforts. The Eugene Bell Foundation, a faith-based NGO, collaborated with North Korean officials to address an emerging tuberculosis (TB) epidemic. In addition to providing medications and supplies, Eugene Bell helped to incorporate international standards into the national TB control program, and engaged additional partners through its relationships with the North Korean government. 10, 11 As the US NGOS began to mobilize such efforts in the DPRK, they encountered an extremely tense sociopolitical environment born from an unresolved war from decades prior that subsequently inflamed further by ongoing political jabs between the governments of the US and the DPRK. Such an atmosphere of mistrust posed a significant challenge to US NGOs and other foreign humanitarian agencies that were trying to build and maintain successful collaborations with the North Korean government. These agencies found themselves maneuvering within a narrow space in which even small missteps could ignite a downward spiral of conflict that would impede programmatic success.
Presently, there are a number of humanitarian agencies operating in North Korea, representing a wide spectrum of success. 12 Several organizations have curtailed their activities in North Korea due to the operating conditions. In public statements explaining its reasons for leaving the country, Doctors without Borders (Médecins Sans Frontières) highlighted policy changes in the North Korean government that were restricting and limiting the activities of humanitarian aid groups. 6 According to the US Institute of Peace, Doctors without Borders withdrew because North Korea "wanted the tangible benefits of humanitarian aid, but would not allow person-to-person contact between North Koreans and the aid workers". 13 In a rare opportunity to discuss the matter with a North Korean representative, one of the authors of this study dis-
Data Processing
The interview transcripts were studied in order to identify thematic content based on the factors defined by the informants. Factors were categorized as "positive", "negative", or "neutral" depending on how they were characterized as influencing the collaboration by the informants. "Neutral" designates factors that were discussed but not designated as positive or negative. All factors mentioned by the informants were recorded and listed in these categories ( Figures  2 and 3 ). Factors that were discussed for proportionately longer times during the interviews, were described as especially critical by the informants or were mentioned by multiple informants were designated as such. Similar factors were grouped into larger themes to analyze the detailed discussions within each theme.
Results
In the first set of interviews, the North Korean informants identified six mission-compatible collaborators among US NGOs: (1) AmeriCares; definition and subsequently, were asked to identify US NGOs that fulfill these criteria ("mission-compatible NGOs"). The North Koreans were asked to provide their perspective on the characteristics of these mission-compatible collaborations that have contributed to programmatic success.
In the second phase of this research, official representatives from six mission-compatible NGOs were interviewed. All mission-compatible NGOs named by the North Korean informants were included in the study. To respect privacy and maintain anonymity, individual comments will not be attributed to any one organization. Interviews were semi-structured and focused on the individual collaboration with the US NGO. Representative questions from both sets of interviews are in Figure 1 .
Access to the North Korean Informants
Arrangements for the first set of interviews were provided by Nodutol for Korean Community Development. Through a long-standing relationship with the North Korean Mission to the UN, each year, this NGO sends delegations of KoreanAmericans to North Korea to participate in the DPRK Exposure and Education Program. In addition to general activities, the NGO facilitates meetings with designated North Korean officials upon request by individual delegates.
Data Transcription
For interviews conducted in English and recorded by audiotape, data were transcribed verbatim into an electronic format (Microsoft Word, Microsoft, Inc, Redmond WA). For interviews conducted in Korean, on-site interpretation was utilized and recorded on audio tape from which the initial transcripts were produced. These transcripts were verified and edited by a second, off-site interpreter. 
Monitoring
The North Korean informants described monitoring as a natural part of healthy collaboration: "We really welcome monitoring because this is the basis for improving future collaborations." One informant described how "it is quite natural that we do monitoring to find out what was wrong, and based on it, improve and set new goals." Joint-monitoring between the donor and the recipients was cited as a particularly successful model to facilitate follow-up discussions that lead to real-time changes in existing plans.
At the same time, the North Korean informants acknowledged that disagreements over monitoring have contributed negatively to past collaborations. This was the case when monitoring requests were viewed as disproportionate to the amount, type, and quality of aid provided. The North Korean informants described such requests as a "nuisance", since facilitating monitoring requires resources that could be better spent elsewhere. Furthermore, when an organization requests an additional level of monitoring, the North Korean authorities perceive the underlying motive to be intelligence gathering rather than providing expanded care to aid recipients.
The US NGOs cited several strategies that work effectively within their given parameters. One informant had to "rethink systems from the ground up to fit the North Korean context better than the off-the-shelf, international models." One NGO implemented "dedication ceremonies" in which monitoring formalities are packaged as a celebratory event rather than an uncomfortable formality. Another strategy has been to shift ownership of monitoring to the North Koreans by switching from "monitoring" to "confirming". Within this context, recipients are asked to monitor aid, thus providing documentation that confirms proper delivery by the donor. The concept of "reverse transparency" also was noted to be a fruitful strategy. In return for detailed information about donor operations, NGOs have received documentation from the North Koreans that otherwise would be provided in a standard monitoring framework.
(9) needs assessments; (10) monitoring; and (11) non-resident status. Factors present in multiple columns were described as positive and negative in different contexts. The following sections explore the points of discussion around the major themes that emerged from the interviews. Exemplary strategies used to improve collaboration will be incorporated into the discussion of these themes when relevant. The US NGO informants also described how critical it is for agencies to respond to the needs identified by the North Korean Ministry of Health. According to the NGO informants, successful NGOs are invited to work in North Korea and respond to a request to focus on a particular area. Such deferral to the guidance of the North Korean Ministry of Health is critical to the success of such collaborations.
Responsiveness to North Korean
Resident Status
Multi-national agencies and foreign NGOs from non-US countries often are granted resident status in North Korea. The North Korean informants identified this as a key advantage. According to these informants, resident status improves the facility of coordination and planning. In addition, it allows for joint monitoring of aid distribution. It also facilitates closer relations between North Korean officials and humanitarian agencies.
Regardless, none of the interviewed US NGOs have resident status. The NGO informants described a number of resulting challenges. For instance, staff members are not allowed to reside in the country, so teams are sent for short missions that are limited to a few days in duration. As a result, donor agencies are required to accomplish their respective objectives in a short period of time. Infrequent exposure to target populations also makes it difficult to implement exhaustive needs assessments and monitoring programs.
In spite of these challenges, several NGOs reported innovative strategies that they have developed in order to non-verbal cues to anticipate needs that are not expressed directly. The NGOs have devised a number of additional strategies to work effectively without optimal access to data: (1) designing integrated packages that work in any setting; (2) utilizing input packages from analogous settings; and (3) supplementing individual needs assessments with those of larger agencies.
Interagency Collaboration
The North Korean informants did not identify interagency collaboration as having a positive or negative impact on program success, but they did explain why it is difficult to facilitate. According to one informant, different departments within the North Korean government are responsible for receiving NGOs and larger, multinational agencies. Because of this organizational structure, the North Koreans cannot easily facilitate exchange between agencies. Furthermore, such exchange is viewed as non-essential from their perspective, since coordination can be managed through their own administration.
In contrast to more unified opinions on the themes previously discussed, the opinions of NGO informants on the issue of interagency collaboration were divided, resulting in divergent strategies among the NGOs interviewed. Interagency collaboration was noted to be problematic by some NGO informants. These NGOs have remained autonomous and have not coordinated their efforts with other agencies, citing the significant administrative barriers to consortium building on the part of their North Korean collaborators. One informant suggested that the North Korean government is wary of consortiums since they empower the donors, producing an uneven power dynamic. For these reasons, some NGOs have foregone requests for interagency collaboration in order to ease their interaction with the North Korean officials.
In contrast, other NGOs have coordinated their efforts with other agencies. This has occurred between NGOs in the form of NGO consortiums, and also between NGOs and larger agencies. One informant described how coordination is advantageous because it prevents duplication and overlap. Information gathering is difficult for any one agency, but when information is shared between agencies, large gaps are filled quite easily. There also is reciprocal benefit when partnering with larger, in-house agencies: non-resident NGOs benefit from the information they receive from resident agencies that conduct ongoing surveillance and in return, NGOs provide updated feedback following on-site visits to sub-recipients.
Discussion
One central theme that has emerged is the importance of respecting North Korean autonomy. The North Korean informants maintain that they are in the best position to coordinate their public health initiatives since they are most intimately aware of the needs of their people and the programs that are in place. This desire for autonomy is a central component of the larger North Korean psyche and is embodied in a core tenet of their ideology. This tenet of "Juche" or self-reliance has been engendered through a history scarred by numerous invasions and occupations. 18, 19 Sincerity: Apolitical Objectives The North Korean informants described "sincerity" as another central factor to success. When asked to define the term, one informant responded that "an agency is deemed sincere if its efforts are based on humanitarianism." Sincerity is demonstrated when agencies "really feel pity for the people who suffer." From the perspective of the North Korean informants, sincerity is based on the lack of political objectives. According to one informant, "what we really want is for them not to pursue political purposes, because that means there are ulterior motives behind their work." More specifically, the informants voiced concern about "propaganda" against their country that is aimed at shaming them. Despite this caution, they give the benefit of the doubt to all new collaborators and with time, they assess the sincerity of their donors and continue collaborating with those agencies that are sincere. Thus, officials working with NGOs place significant importance on the perception of sincerity as a foundation for allowing ongoing programmatic access.
The NGOs recognize the need to avoid political objectives. One informant described how "they [the North Koreans] are weary of us coming in and depicting it as a dysfunctional place where everyone is dying." Therefore, the NGOs are careful in designing promotional materials. Materials are designed such that, if a North Korean were to see it, "they would not be embarrassed or humiliated." Furthermore, the NGO informants have observed that successful organizations in North Korea do not have dedicated human rights advocacy programs. The informants explained that, while human rights are of critical importance, the presence of dedicated human rights advocacy programs most likely weakens trust, thereby restricting access.
Information Gathering and Needs Assessments
The North Korean informants described how information gathering has been a major point of contention. They agree with their collaborators on its value in implementing needs assessments, but they disagree on the question of ownership of data. In their view, foreign collaborators have little need for data that can be managed adequately by its Ministry of Health. One informant described this in terms of maintaining the dignity of the North Korean government by trusting their expertise and not requesting sensitive information.
Information gathering also was identified as a challenge by all of the NGO informants. According to one informant, the transfer of information is more fluid in other settings because of frequent conversations that occur between donor and recipient. In North Korea, the NGOs do not reside in country and have limited interaction with local staff. In addition, language barriers complicate the process. One informant also described how North Koreans often are reticent and perhaps even embarrassed about voicing specific needs.
Despite these challenges, the NGO informants noted that they have been able to obtain valuable information while working within given parameters. Focused needs assessments are conducted during in-person visits facilitated to recipient sites a few times each year. To improve language compatibility, the NGOs identify on-site staff members able to communicate detailed information in English. In addition, seasoned collaborators have learned to pick up on Information gathering was another prevalent theme discussed. Although historically, information gathering has been treated with caution by the North Koreans, they understand its place in optimizing aid provision. In reality, data still are highly protected in North Korea, with strict government control over the flow of information. 31 Thus, humanitarian agencies are faced with the challenge of acquiring adequate data to guide their operations. As they have when faced with other challenges, the NGOs have developed strategies to work within given parameters and have been able to collect adequate data to direct aid provision.
Interagency collaboration was a final theme that was discussed. From the North Korean perspective, such collaboration is non-essential, since the organizing capabilities of their administration are deemed sufficient. In addition, facilitating such collaboration places a significant administrative burden on the North Koreans due to the internal political structure of the country. 32 Nonetheless, NGOs that prioritize interagency collaboration have sought it in various forms. Fully aware that such collaboration could be interpreted as insidious, these agencies have maintained transparency with their North Korean counterparts, and have noted that, so far, the North Koreans have accommodated their requests. Other NGOs have avoided the issue altogether by remaining autonomous. Both strategies are perceived as effective, and both approaches exemplify the diplomatic strategy of maintaining collaborations by building trust.
This example illustrates how the North Koreans also have made significant concessions. Deferring to the requests for interagency meetings represents a drastic paradigm shift for the North Koreans, who historically, have viewed coordination and planning as a function of their native governing body. Similar concessions were made concerning other themes. For example, the North Korean officials are beginning to learn the value of monitoring through their experiences with the NGOs and have facilitated a number of monitoring activities for the NGOs. The North Koreans also have accommodated agencies with outspoken political objectives. For example, the Buddhist Sharing Movement has openly reported on human rights issues in North Korea, but the North Korean officials still are willing to partner with the organization. 33 From these and other examples, it appears that the North Koreans have made significant concessions, as have the NGOs, to maintain collaborative relations. This point is especially important to recognize given the global political landscape and the general perception by western nations that North Korean authorities are unwilling to negotiate or concede. [34] [35] [36] The themes that emerged from the study comprise the perceived factors that have contributed to programmatic success in humanitarian collaboration from both the perspective of US NGOs and North Korean officials. Although a number of the described concepts are unique to the situation in North Korea, some are consistent with themes that pervade established guidelines used globally to assess efficacy in humanitarian operations. 24, 37, 38 Among the indicators of progress prescribed in the Paris Declaration, the themes of ownership, alignment, harmonization, managing results, and mutual accountability are shared with the results of the current study. The themes of The NGOs interviewed in this study recognize this desire for autonomy and have been willing to defer to requests made by North Korean officials whenever possible.
A second major theme identified by the current study was the relevance of resident status. Larger, international agencies often are granted resident status in North Korea, allowing for permanent offices in the country to coordinate humanitarian operations on the ground. In contrast, US NGOs have been disallowed from establishing offices in North Korea. 20 Political confrontation between governments and a fear that the offices could be used to conduct espionage have been postulated as reasons for such a restriction on US NGOs. 21 Although US NGOs are nominally separated from the government, suspected affiliation could explain the reluctance on the part of the North Koreans to grant resident status to US NGOs. Both the North Korean and NGO informants described a number of challenges as a result of this, but the NGOs have developed innovative strategies to adapt.
Monitoring policies also were discussed in depth. As a general policy, agencies can travel where aid has been sent. In most circumstances, this equates to verifying the receipt of shipments at a central warehouse, but the North Koreans also allow site visits upon request. Historically, one of the major criticisms of the North Korean government has been on the issue of monitoring, and disagreements have resulted in aborted collaborations. 22, 23 Such dissension is understandable, since North Korean monitoring policies do not fit the standards adopted by the international community. 24, 25 Thus, the NGOs working in North Korea face a tension between demanding minimum standards and respecting the dignity of their North Korean partners. 26, 27 Moreover, successful US NGOs recognize that standards cannot be imposed. Instead of inflexibly demanding these standards, these NGOs have worked within given parameters to develop a paradigm for monitoring that shifts ownership to the recipients. Although this model differs from standard models, the NGOs claim that adopting it is more effective than forcefully applying the standard model. Yet another theme identified by informants on both sides was the issue of "sincerity" or a lack of political objective. Since the North Koreans gauge sincerity based on the degree to which politics affect motives, one would expect government affiliation to negatively affect the trust North Koreans have for a potential collaborator. However, informants on both sides described how the actions of the agencies are more important than any affiliation. For example direct human rights activism was noted as a distinct disadvantage. Therefore, a number of NGOs have separated service provision from human rights advocacy in North Korea. As a result, they have gained the trust of their North Korean counterparts. Nonetheless, the justification for such a separation of human rights and humanitarianism is controversial and has sparked lively discussions among those involved in foreign policy. [28] [29] [30] Such considerations related to perceptions of sincerity underscore the need to address the baseline of mistrust that historically has strained relations with North Korea. To that end, experienced collaborators have adopted a form of health diplomacy that improves trust, which ultimately facilitates programmatic success.
Further outcomes research utilizing population-based data will be required to assess the effectiveness of these collaborations comprehensively and to validate these strategies more thoroughly.
In addition, the number and composition of informants on both sides limited the study. Interviewing only three North Korean informants provided a limited view on the topic, even though the North Korean informants were designated spokesmen and experts in their field. Furthermore, only those agencies identified by the North Koreans were interviewed; further diversity of perspectives could have been reached by including agencies that were considered unsuccessful as well as agencies that were not mentioned by the North Koreans.The study also focused on collaborations between US NGOs and the North Korean government so as to inform future ventures by US-based humanitarian agencies. Including collaborations with NGOs from other countries would have added further insight. Thus, subsequent studies involving more perspectives will be required to substantiate the initial findings from the current work and to further delineate the nature of these collaborations.
Conclusions
Overall, the interviews with North Korean and NGO informants indicated a number of critical factors that may determine the success of humanitarian collaborations in North Korea. They also confirm that North Korea is a setting with unique parameters that must be fully appreciated. Successful US NGOs have recognized this and have devised innovative measures to work effectively within these unique parameters. Nevertheless, it is critical to acknowledge that the North Koreans also have made significant concessions to maintain collaborations. In fact, it appears that both sides made important concessions that have placed chief importance on the health of the collaboration. Therefore, continued programmatic success in humanitarian collaboration will depend on prioritizing the dynamics of the relationship as to build trust within a strained sociopolitical environment with a historic baseline of mistrust. This form of diplomacy engenders an atmosphere of trust and accountability, which will facilitate the sharing of critical outcomes data that ultimately will improve the quality of these collaborations through informed outcomes evaluation. It is with this collaborative spirit that partnerships have been and will continue to be maintained in a complex and unique sociopolitical environment. participation, assessment, response, and monitoring that are incorporated into the Sphere standards also are shared. Therefore, the themes that emerged from the present study are consistent with those that have been identified previously as critical points in the discussion of humanitarian effectiveness.
Nevertheless, there are notable inconsistencies between global standards and the perspectives described in this study in regard to particular points within each theme. For example, within the theme of information gathering, the strategies adopted by the US NGOs in North Korea do not meet the particular standards for data accessibility and transparency that are stipulated in the Sphere standards. At face value, these inconsistencies signal that operating conditions in North Korea may be sub-standard and in need of improvement. Alternatively, such inconsistencies reinforce a concern that current global standards are in need of revision. In fact, during 2009, the Sphere standards will undergo a major revision focused on the core "life-saving" sectors of humanitarian response. 39 These revisions may accommodate for inconsistencies between current standards and practice, such as those identified in the present study. Alternatively, these observed inconsistencies may demonstrate that current standards do not capture a dimension of humanitarian action that is relevant to collaborations in complex environments like North Korea. The Sphere project also has acknowledged this possibility and plans to augment their core standards with Sphere Companion Standards that address dimensions of humanitarian action that are outside of their traditional core sectors. 40 Yet, another possibility is that these inconsistencies reflect unique parameters in North Korea that are not applicable elsewhere, and thus, are incompatible with standardized evaluations. In such a case, program evaluation might best be accomplished through assessment of predetermined goals specific to an operational context rather than through global standards. Regardless of which approach for evaluation will prove most appropriate in North Korea, definitive assessments will require accurate quantitative outcomes data.
Limitations
The last point regarding outcomes evaluation introduces one of the principal limitations of the present study. The primary limitation relates to the definition of success employed in this study as a subjective determination of the ability to meet programmatic objectives. Although success was defined in these terms, no quantitative evidence was collected. As such, perceived programmatic success serves as a surrogate for quantifiable process and outcomes indicators. That being said, the findings of this study suggest that certain programmatic features can logically enhance the effectiveness of programs in North Korea. Therefore, the factors identified in the study can inform future strategies to maintain health sector collaborations with North Korea.
